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WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTION'S WORST
PROVISION?
Robert Post*
I confess that when Sandy Levinson asked me to contribute
to this Symposium I had a momentary flash of panic, the same
searing sense of stammering inadequacy that always seems to
well up whenever my ten-year-old daughter Amelia asks such
pointed questions as "What is your favorite movie?" or "What
color do you hate the most?" For someone like myself who perenially and professionally shifts among subdued shades of gray,
celebrating nuance and complexity, such invitations to extreme
and personal self-assertion are not only disruptive, they are
downright painful. They flex muscles that have long atrophied.
Swallowing my anxiety, however, and accepting the assignment, I first faced a conundrum. What, after all, should count as
the Constitution? I have in the past been critical enough of First
Amendment doctrine that I have seen as deeply mistaken. But
should such doctrine be treated as the Constitution for purposes
of this Symposium? Probably not, because the question we have
been asked to answer seems in its premises to point toward a
specific and contained document, the one generally printed at the
beginning or end of constitutional law casebooks. In this sense
the question appears to embody an implicit distinction between
amendment and interpretation.
Perhaps because this distinction has relatively little meaning
in the areas in which I work, I should be clear that I rarely in fact
read the document of the Constitution. Although the document
creates a profound structure of governance, it has always seemed
to me to contain an extraordinarily sparse and haphazard collection of rules for the management of that structure. Because this
Symposium is not the proper occasion to assess large and deep
questions of constitutional design (such as whether the Constitution erred in failing to establish a parliamentary system), I felt
compelled to tum to this odd (and largely unfamiliar) collection
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of rules to find my candidate for the Constitution's worst
mistake.
.
I was looking for a relatively clear rule that continues today
m legal force and yet that somehow stands out as egregiously
unacceptable. I thus ruled out the original constitutional provisions dealing with slavery, for these have long since been discredited and rendered inoperable. I also ruled out provisions like the
direct tax clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 4), whose meaning has never
been very clear to me.
Given these constraints, my final choice was Article II, § 1,
cl. 5:
No person except a natural born Citizen, or Citizen of the
United States at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the Office of President ....

The Clause is currently in force. It is remarkably innocent of
both legislative history and judicial gloss.t Although it contains a
number of important ambiguities, notably on the question of
whether foreign-born children of American citizens qualify as
"natural born, "2 the Clause is highly objectionable because it unmistakably and clearly prohibits naturalized citizens from becoming President.
Without doubt Joseph Story correctly identified the purpose
of this prohibition as cutting "off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office. "3 We
might therefore understand the Clause as resting on three propositions: It distinguishes citizens from foreigners; it reserves the
Office of the Presidency for the former; and it classifies naturalized citizens with the latter. It is the third and last proposition
that I find so disturbing.
Our constitutional order does not ordinarily distribute the
prerogatives of citizenship on the basis of where or how one is
born.4 The Court has explained that this is because:
1. See generally, J. Michael Medina, The Presidential Qualijicaticn Clause in This
Bicentennial Year: The Need to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen Requirement,12 Okla.
City U. L. Rev. 253 (1987).
2. On this question, see Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the Uniled
States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Eustace Seligman, A Brief for
Governor Romney's Eligibility for President, 113 Cong. Rec. 35, 109 (1967).
3. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 541
(Abridged Edition, 1833) (reprinted Carolina Academic Press 1987).
4. For a possible exception involving so-called "Non-Fourteenth Amendment" citizens, i.e., children of U.S. citizens who are born abroad, see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815
(1971).
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Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty
of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal
obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under
our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility
to the Presidency.s
Our constitutional order, in other words, divides citizens from
non-citizens on the basis of membership in our polity. Allegiance is the sign of membership. Because allegiance is a matter
of voluntary commitment rather than birth, it should not systematically differ as between naturalized and natural born citizens.
That is why virtually everywhere in our constitutional order "the
rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive."6 The one exception is the clause of the Constitution we are now considering.
The exception arises because the Clause makes a person's
status at birth a proxy for allegiance. Thus at the very heart of
the constitutional order, in the Office of the President, the Constitution abandons its brave experiment of forging a new society
based upon principles of voluntary commitment; it instead
gropes for security among ties of blood and contingencies of
birth. In a world of ethnic cleansing, where affirmations of allegiance are drowned in attributes of status, this constitutional provision is a chilling reminder of a path not taken, of a fate we have
struggled to avoid. It is a vestigal excrescence on the face of our
Constitution.

5.
6.

Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964).

